kernel-5.14.0-687.31.1.el9_8

CVE-2025-39797
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: Duplicate SPI Handling The issue originates when Strongswan initiates an XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI Netlink message, which triggers the kernel function xfrm_alloc_spi(). This function is expected to ensure uniqueness of the Security Parameter Index (SPI) for inbound Security Associations (SAs). However, it can return success even when the requested SPI is already in use, leading to duplicate SPIs assigned to multiple inbound SAs, differentiated only by their destination addresses. This behavior causes inconsistencies during SPI lookups for inbound packets. Since the lookup may return an arbitrary SA among those with the same SPI, packet processing can fail, resulting in packet drops. According to RFC 4301 section 4.4.2 , for inbound processing a unicast SA is uniquely identified by the SPI and optionally protocol. Reproducing the Issue Reliably: To consistently reproduce the problem, restrict the available SPI range in charon.conf : spi_min = 0x10000000 spi_max = 0x10000002 This limits the system to only 2 usable SPI values. Next, create more than 2 Child SA. each using unique pair of src/dst address. As soon as the 3rd Child SA is initiated, it will be assigned a duplicate SPI, since the SPI pool is already exhausted. With a narrow SPI range, the issue is consistently reproducible. With a broader/default range, it becomes rare and unpredictable. Current implementation: xfrm_spi_hash() lookup function computes hash using daddr, proto, and family. So if two SAs have the same SPI but different destination addresses, then they will: a. Hash into different buckets b. Be stored in different linked lists (byspi + h) c. Not be seen in the same hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() iteration. As a result, the lookup will result in NULL and kernel allows that Duplicate SPI Proposed Change: xfrm_state_lookup_spi_proto() does a truly global search - across all states, regardless of hash bucket and matches SPI and proto.

CVE-2026-52973
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash alloc Currently need_futex_hash_allocate_default() depends on strict pthread semantics, abusing CLONE_THREAD. This breaks the non-concurrency assumptions when doing the mm->futex_ref pcpu allocations, leading to bugs[0] when sharing the mm in other ways; ie: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in futex_hash_put ... where the +1 bias can end up on a percpu counter that mm->futex_ref no longer points at. Loosen the check to cover any CLONE_VM clone, except vfork(). Excluding vfork keeps the existing paths untouched (no overhead), and we can't race in the first place: either the parent is suspended and the child runs alone, or mm->futex_ref is already allocated from an earlier CLONE_VM.

CVE-2026-64017
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-mq: pop cached request if it is usable When submitting a bio to blk-mq, if the task should sleep after peeking a cached request, but before it pops it, the plug flushes and calls blk_mq_free_plug_rqs, freeing the cached_rqs. This creates a use-after-free bug. Fix this by popping the cached request before any possible blocking calls if it is suitable for use. Popping this request first holds a queue reference, so avoid any serialization races with queue freezes and can safely proceed with dispatching that request to the driver. This potentially increases a timing window from when a driver wants to freeze its queue to when requests stop being dispatched. That scenario is off the fast path though, and drivers need to appropriately handle requests during a freeze request anyway. The downside is the popped element needs to be individually freed when we performed a bio plug merge. The cached request would have had to be freed later anyway, but this patch does it inline with building the plug list instead of after flushing it.