kernel-4.18.0-553.92.1.el8_10

CVE-2025-39993
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: rc: fix races with imon_disconnect() Syzbot reports a KASAN issue as below: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __create_pipe include/linux/usb.h:1945 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in send_packet+0xa2d/0xbc0 drivers/media/rc/imon.c:627 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880256fb000 by task syz-executor314/4465 CPU: 2 PID: 4465 Comm: syz-executor314 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline] print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x6e9 mm/kasan/report.c:433 kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 __create_pipe include/linux/usb.h:1945 [inline] send_packet+0xa2d/0xbc0 drivers/media/rc/imon.c:627 vfd_write+0x2d9/0x550 drivers/media/rc/imon.c:991 vfs_write+0x2d7/0xdd0 fs/read_write.c:576 ksys_write+0x127/0x250 fs/read_write.c:631 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The iMON driver improperly releases the usb_device reference in imon_disconnect without coordinating with active users of the device. Specifically, the fields usbdev_intf0 and usbdev_intf1 are not protected by the users counter (ictx->users). During probe, imon_init_intf0 or imon_init_intf1 increments the usb_device reference count depending on the interface. However, during disconnect, usb_put_dev is called unconditionally, regardless of actual usage. As a result, if vfd_write or other operations are still in progress after disconnect, this can lead to a use-after-free of the usb_device pointer. Thread 1 vfd_write Thread 2 imon_disconnect ... if usb_put_dev(ictx->usbdev_intf0) else usb_put_dev(ictx->usbdev_intf1) ... while send_packet if pipe = usb_sndintpipe( ictx->usbdev_intf0) UAF else pipe = usb_sndctrlpipe( ictx->usbdev_intf0, 0) UAF Guard access to usbdev_intf0 and usbdev_intf1 after disconnect by checking ictx->disconnected in all writer paths. Add early return with -ENODEV in send_packet(), vfd_write(), lcd_write() and display_open() if the device is no longer present. Set and read ictx->disconnected under ictx->lock to ensure memory synchronization. Acquire the lock in imon_disconnect() before setting the flag to synchronize with any ongoing operations. Ensure writers exit early and safely after disconnect before the USB core proceeds with cleanup. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

CVE-2025-68285
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: fix potential use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map() The wait loop in __ceph_open_session() can race with the client receiving a new monmap or osdmap shortly after the initial map is received. Both ceph_monc_handle_map() and handle_one_map() install a new map immediately after freeing the old one kfree(monc->monmap); monc->monmap = monmap; ceph_osdmap_destroy(osdc->osdmap); osdc->osdmap = newmap; under client->monc.mutex and client->osdc.lock respectively, but because neither is taken in have_mon_and_osd_map() it's possible for client->monc.monmap->epoch and client->osdc.osdmap->epoch arms in client->monc.monmap && client->monc.monmap->epoch && client->osdc.osdmap && client->osdc.osdmap->epoch; condition to dereference an already freed map. This happens to be reproducible with generic/395 and generic/397 with KASAN enabled: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811012d810 by task mount.ceph/13305 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13305 Comm: mount.ceph Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2-build2+ #1266 ... Call Trace: have_mon_and_osd_map+0x56/0x70 ceph_open_session+0x182/0x290 ceph_get_tree+0x333/0x680 vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180 do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0 path_mount+0x6dd/0x730 do_mount+0x99/0xe0 __do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Allocated by task 13305: ceph_osdmap_alloc+0x16/0x130 ceph_osdc_init+0x27a/0x4c0 ceph_create_client+0x153/0x190 create_fs_client+0x50/0x2a0 ceph_get_tree+0xff/0x680 vfs_get_tree+0x49/0x180 do_new_mount+0x1a3/0x2d0 path_mount+0x6dd/0x730 do_mount+0x99/0xe0 __do_sys_mount+0x141/0x180 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 9475: kfree+0x212/0x290 handle_one_map+0x23c/0x3b0 ceph_osdc_handle_map+0x3c9/0x590 mon_dispatch+0x655/0x6f0 ceph_con_process_message+0xc3/0xe0 ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x614/0x760 ceph_con_workfn+0x2de/0x650 process_one_work+0x486/0x7c0 process_scheduled_works+0x73/0x90 worker_thread+0x1c8/0x2a0 kthread+0x2ec/0x300 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Rewrite the wait loop to check the above condition directly with client->monc.mutex and client->osdc.lock taken as appropriate. While at it, improve the timeout handling (previously mount_timeout could be exceeded in case wait_event_interruptible_timeout() slept more than once) and access client->auth_err under client->monc.mutex to match how it's set in finish_auth(). monmap_show() and osdmap_show() now take the respective lock before accessing the map as well.