freerdp-2.11.7-4.el8_10

FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), released under the Apache license. The xfreerdp client can connect to RDP servers such as Microsoft Windows machines, xrdp, and VirtualBox.

Security Fix(es):

* freerdp: FreeRDP: Arbitrary code execution via heap out-of-bounds write in RLE planar decode path (CVE-2026-26965)
* freerdp: FreeRDP: Arbitrary code execution via heap buffer overflow in GDI surface pipeline (CVE-2026-26955)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

CVE-2026-26955
FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to version 3.23.0, a malicious RDP server can trigger a heap buffer overflow in FreeRDP clients using the GDI surface pipeline (e.g., `xfreerdp`) by sending an RDPGFX ClearCodec surface command with an out-of-bounds destination rectangle. The `gdi_SurfaceCommand_ClearCodec()` handler does not call `is_within_surface()` to validate the command rectangle against the destination surface dimensions, allowing attacker-controlled `cmd->left`/`cmd->top` (and subcodec rectangle offsets) to reach image copy routines that write into `surface->data` without bounds enforcement. The OOB write corrupts an adjacent `gdiGfxSurface` struct's `codecs*` pointer with attacker-controlled pixel data, and corruption of `codecs*` is sufficient to reach an indirect function pointer call (`NSC_CONTEXT.decode` at `nsc.c:500`) on a subsequent codec command — full instruction pointer (RIP) control demonstrated in exploitability harness. Users should upgrade to version 3.23.0 to receive a patch.
CVE-2026-26965
FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to version 3.23.0, in the RLE planar decode path, `planar_decompress_plane_rle()` writes into `pDstData` at `((nYDst+y) * nDstStep) + (4*nXDst) + nChannel` without verifying that `(nYDst+nSrcHeight)` fits in the destination height or that `(nXDst+nSrcWidth)` fits in the destination stride. When `TempFormat != DstFormat`, `pDstData` becomes `planar->pTempData` (sized for the desktop), while `nYDst` is only validated against the **surface** by `is_within_surface()`. A malicious RDP server can exploit this to perform a heap out-of-bounds write with attacker-controlled offset and pixel data on any connecting FreeRDP client. The OOB write reaches up to 132,096 bytes past the temp buffer end, and on the brk heap (desktop ≤ 128×128), an adjacent `NSC_CONTEXT` struct's `decode` function pointer is overwritten with attacker-controlled pixel data — control-flow–relevant corruption (function pointer overwritten) demonstrated under deterministic heap layout (`nsc->decode = 0xFF414141FF414141`). Version 3.23.0 fixes the vulnerability.