kernel-5.14.0-611.26.1.el9_7

The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system.

Security Fix(es):

* kernel: Linux kernel: Use-after-free in device mapper due to race condition in zone reporting (CVE-2025-38141)
* kernel: Linux kernel use-after-free in eventpoll (CVE-2025-38349)
* kernel: drm/xe: Fix vm_bind_ioctl double free bug (CVE-2025-38731)
* kernel: Linux kernel: vsock vulnerability may lead to memory corruption (CVE-2025-40248)
* kernel: mptcp: fix race condition in mptcp_schedule_work() (CVE-2025-40258)
* kernel: Linux kernel: Out-of-bounds write in Bluetooth MGMT can lead to information disclosure and denial of service (CVE-2025-40294)
* kernel: net: atlantic: fix fragment overflow handling in RX path (CVE-2025-68301)
* kernel: Bluetooth: hci_sock: Prevent race in socket write iter and sock bind (CVE-2025-68305)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

CVE-2025-38141
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm: fix dm_blk_report_zones If dm_get_live_table() returned NULL, dm_put_live_table() was never called. Also, it is possible that md->zone_revalidate_map will change while calling this function. Only read it once, so that we are always using the same value. Otherwise we might miss a call to dm_put_live_table(). Finally, while md->zone_revalidate_map is set and a process is calling blk_revalidate_disk_zones() to set up the zone append emulation resources, it is possible that another process, perhaps triggered by blkdev_report_zones_ioctl(), will call dm_blk_report_zones(). If blk_revalidate_disk_zones() fails, these resources can be freed while the other process is still using them, causing a use-after-free error. blk_revalidate_disk_zones() will only ever be called when initially setting up the zone append emulation resources, such as when setting up a zoned dm-crypt table for the first time. Further table swaps will not set md->zone_revalidate_map or call blk_revalidate_disk_zones(). However it must be called using the new table (referenced by md->zone_revalidate_map) and the new queue limits while the DM device is suspended. dm_blk_report_zones() needs some way to distinguish between a call from blk_revalidate_disk_zones(), which must be allowed to use md->zone_revalidate_map to access this not yet activated table, and all other calls to dm_blk_report_zones(), which should not be allowed while the device is suspended and cannot use md->zone_revalidate_map, since the zone resources might be freed by the process currently calling blk_revalidate_disk_zones(). Solve this by tracking the process that sets md->zone_revalidate_map in dm_revalidate_zones() and only allowing that process to make use of it in dm_blk_report_zones().
CVE-2025-38349
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: don't decrement ep refcount while still holding the ep mutex Jann Horn points out that epoll is decrementing the ep refcount and then doing a mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx); afterwards. That's very wrong, because it can lead to a use-after-free. That pattern is actually fine for the very last reference, because the code in question will delay the actual call to "ep_free(ep)" until after it has unlocked the mutex. But it's wrong for the much subtler "next to last" case when somebody *else* may also be dropping their reference and free the ep while we're still using the mutex. Note that this is true even if that other user is also using the same ep mutex: mutexes, unlike spinlocks, can not be used for object ownership, even if they guarantee mutual exclusion. A mutex "unlock" operation is not atomic, and as one user is still accessing the mutex as part of unlocking it, another user can come in and get the now released mutex and free the data structure while the first user is still cleaning up. See our mutex documentation in Documentation/locking/mutex-design.rst, in particular the section [1] about semantics: "mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure even after it has internally released the lock already - so it's not safe for another context to acquire the mutex and assume that the mutex_unlock() context is not using the structure anymore" So if we drop our ep ref before the mutex unlock, but we weren't the last one, we may then unlock the mutex, another user comes in, drops _their_ reference and releases the 'ep' as it now has no users - all while the mutex_unlock() is still accessing it. Fix this by simply moving the ep refcount dropping to outside the mutex: the refcount itself is atomic, and doesn't need mutex protection (that's the whole _point_ of refcounts: unlike mutexes, they are inherently about object lifetimes).
CVE-2025-38731
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Fix vm_bind_ioctl double free bug If the argument check during an array bind fails, the bind_ops are freed twice as seen below. Fix this by setting bind_ops to NULL after freeing. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: double-free in xe_vm_bind_ioctl+0x1b2/0x21f0 [xe] Free of addr ffff88813bb9b800 by task xe_vm/14198 CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 14198 Comm: xe_vm Not tainted 6.16.0-xe-eudebug-cmanszew+ #520 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-P DDR5 RVP, BIOS ADLPFWI1.R00.2411.A02.2110081023 10/08/2021 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xd0 print_report+0xcb/0x610 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x19a/0x300 ? xe_vm_bind_ioctl+0x1b2/0x21f0 [xe] kasan_report_invalid_free+0xc8/0xf0 ? xe_vm_bind_ioctl+0x1b2/0x21f0 [xe] ? xe_vm_bind_ioctl+0x1b2/0x21f0 [xe] check_slab_allocation+0x102/0x130 kfree+0x10d/0x440 ? should_fail_ex+0x57/0x2f0 ? xe_vm_bind_ioctl+0x1b2/0x21f0 [xe] xe_vm_bind_ioctl+0x1b2/0x21f0 [xe] ? __pfx_xe_vm_bind_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe] ? __lock_acquire+0xab9/0x27f0 ? lock_acquire+0x165/0x300 ? drm_dev_enter+0x53/0xe0 [drm] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? drm_dev_exit+0x30/0x50 [drm] ? drm_ioctl_kernel+0x128/0x1c0 [drm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x128/0x1c0 [drm] ? __pfx_xe_vm_bind_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? __pfx_drm_ioctl_kernel+0x10/0x10 [drm] ? should_fail_ex+0x57/0x2f0 ? __pfx_xe_vm_bind_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe] drm_ioctl+0x352/0x620 [drm] ? __pfx_drm_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [drm] ? __pfx_rpm_resume+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11a/0x1b0 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x61/0xc0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xac/0xe0 xe_drm_ioctl+0x91/0xc0 [xe] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xb2/0x100 ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x68/0x2e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fa9acb24ded (cherry picked from commit a01b704527c28a2fd43a17a85f8996b75ec8492a)
CVE-2025-40248
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock: Ignore signal/timeout on connect() if already established During connect(), acting on a signal/timeout by disconnecting an already established socket leads to several issues: 1. connect() invoking vsock_transport_cancel_pkt() -> virtio_transport_purge_skbs() may race with sendmsg() invoking virtio_transport_get_credit(). This results in a permanently elevated `vvs->bytes_unsent`. Which, in turn, confuses the SOCK_LINGER handling. 2. connect() resetting a connected socket's state may race with socket being placed in a sockmap. A disconnected socket remaining in a sockmap breaks sockmap's assumptions. And gives rise to WARNs. 3. connect() transitioning SS_CONNECTED -> SS_UNCONNECTED allows for a transport change/drop after TCP_ESTABLISHED. Which poses a problem for any simultaneous sendmsg() or connect() and may result in a use-after-free/null-ptr-deref. Do not disconnect socket on signal/timeout. Keep the logic for unconnected sockets: they don't linger, can't be placed in a sockmap, are rejected by sendmsg(). [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/e07fd95c-9a38-4eea-9638-133e38c2ec9b@rbox... [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250317-vsock-trans-signal-race-v4-0-fc8... [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/60f1b7db-3099-4f6a-875e-af9f6ef194f6@rbox...
CVE-2025-40258
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: fix race condition in mptcp_schedule_work() syzbot reported use-after-free in mptcp_schedule_work() [1] Issue here is that mptcp_schedule_work() schedules a work, then gets a refcount on sk->sk_refcnt if the work was scheduled. This refcount will be released by mptcp_worker(). [A] if (schedule_work(...)) { [B] sock_hold(sk); return true; } Problem is that mptcp_worker() can run immediately and complete before [B] We need instead : sock_hold(sk); if (schedule_work(...)) return true; sock_put(sk); [1] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 29 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfa/0x1d0 lib/refcount.c:25 Call Trace: __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:-1 [inline] __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:366 [inline] refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:383 [inline] sock_hold include/net/sock.h:816 [inline] mptcp_schedule_work+0x164/0x1a0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:943 mptcp_tout_timer+0x21/0xa0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2316 call_timer_fn+0x17e/0x5f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1747 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1798 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2372 [inline] __run_timer_base+0x648/0x970 kernel/time/timer.c:2384 run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2393 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0xb7/0x180 kernel/time/timer.c:2403 handle_softirqs+0x22f/0x710 kernel/softirq.c:622 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline] run_ktimerd+0xcf/0x190 kernel/softirq.c:1138 smpboot_thread_fn+0x542/0xa60 kernel/smpboot.c:160 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x4bc/0x870 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
CVE-2025-40294
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix OOB access in parse_adv_monitor_pattern() In the parse_adv_monitor_pattern() function, the value of the 'length' variable is currently limited to HCI_MAX_EXT_AD_LENGTH(251). The size of the 'value' array in the mgmt_adv_pattern structure is 31. If the value of 'pattern[i].length' is set in the user space and exceeds 31, the 'patterns[i].value' array can be accessed out of bound when copied. Increasing the size of the 'value' array in the 'mgmt_adv_pattern' structure will break the userspace. Considering this, and to avoid OOB access revert the limits for 'offset' and 'length' back to the value of HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH. Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
CVE-2025-68301
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: atlantic: fix fragment overflow handling in RX path The atlantic driver can receive packets with more than MAX_SKB_FRAGS (17) fragments when handling large multi-descriptor packets. This causes an out-of-bounds write in skb_add_rx_frag_netmem() leading to kernel panic. The issue occurs because the driver doesn't check the total number of fragments before calling skb_add_rx_frag(). When a packet requires more than MAX_SKB_FRAGS fragments, the fragment index exceeds the array bounds. Fix by assuming there will be an extra frag if buff->len > AQ_CFG_RX_HDR_SIZE, then all fragments are accounted for. And reusing the existing check to prevent the overflow earlier in the code path. This crash occurred in production with an Aquantia AQC113 10G NIC. Stack trace from production environment: ``` RIP: 0010:skb_add_rx_frag_netmem+0x29/0xd0 Code: 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 41 89 ca 48 89 d7 48 63 ce 8b 90 c0 00 00 00 48 c1 e1 04 48 01 ca 48 03 90 c8 00 00 00 <48> 89 7a 30 44 89 52 3c 44 89 42 38 40 f6 c7 01 75 74 48 89 fa 83 RSP: 0018:ffffa9bec02a8d50 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: ffff925b22e80a00 RBX: ffff925ad38d2700 RCX: fffffffe0a0c8000 RDX: ffff9258ea95bac0 RSI: ffff925ae0a0c800 RDI: 0000000000037a40 RBP: 0000000000000024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000021 R10: 0000000000000848 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa9bec02a8e24 R13: ffff925ad8615570 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff925b22e80a00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff925e47880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff9258ea95baf0 CR3: 0000000166022004 CR4: 0000000000f72ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: aq_ring_rx_clean+0x175/0xe60 [atlantic] ? aq_ring_rx_clean+0x14d/0xe60 [atlantic] ? aq_ring_tx_clean+0xdf/0x190 [atlantic] ? kmem_cache_free+0x348/0x450 ? aq_vec_poll+0x81/0x1d0 [atlantic] ? __napi_poll+0x28/0x1c0 ? net_rx_action+0x337/0x420 ``` Changes in v4: - Add Fixes: tag to satisfy patch validation requirements. Changes in v3: - Fix by assuming there will be an extra frag if buff->len > AQ_CFG_RX_HDR_SIZE, then all fragments are accounted for.
CVE-2025-68305
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sock: Prevent race in socket write iter and sock bind There is a potential race condition between sock bind and socket write iter. bind may free the same cmd via mgmt_pending before write iter sends the cmd, just as syzbot reported in UAF[1]. Here we use hci_dev_lock to synchronize the two, thereby avoiding the UAF mentioned in [1]. [1] syzbot reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_pending_remove+0x3b/0x210 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:316 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888077164818 by task syz.0.17/5989 Call Trace: mgmt_pending_remove+0x3b/0x210 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:316 set_link_security+0x5c2/0x710 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1918 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742 sock_write_iter+0x279/0x360 net/socket.c:1195 Allocated by task 5989: mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296 set_link_security+0x557/0x710 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1910 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742 sock_write_iter+0x279/0x360 net/socket.c:1195 Freed by task 5991: mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline] mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257 mgmt_index_removed+0x112/0x2f0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9477 hci_sock_bind+0xbe9/0x1000 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1314