runc-1.1.9-2.el9_3
エラータID: AXSA:2023-7057:04
The runC tool is a lightweight, portable implementation of the Open Container Format (OCF) that provides container runtime.
Security Fix(es):
* golang: crypto/tls: slow verification of certificate chains containing large RSA keys (CVE-2023-29409)
* golang: crypto/tls: panic when processing post-handshake message on QUIC connections (CVE-2023-39321)
* golang: crypto/tls: lack of a limit on buffered post-handshake (CVE-2023-39322)
For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.
CVE-2023-29409
Extremely large RSA keys in certificate chains can cause a client/server to expend significant CPU time verifying signatures. With fix, the size of RSA keys transmitted during handshakes is restricted to <= 8192 bits. Based on a survey of publicly trusted RSA keys, there are currently only three certificates in circulation with keys larger than this, and all three appear to be test certificates that are not actively deployed. It is possible there are larger keys in use in private PKIs, but we target the web PKI, so causing breakage here in the interests of increasing the default safety of users of crypto/tls seems reasonable.
CVE-2023-39321
Processing an incomplete post-handshake message for a QUIC connection can cause a panic.
CVE-2023-39322
QUIC connections do not set an upper bound on the amount of data buffered when reading post-handshake messages, allowing a malicious QUIC connection to cause unbounded memory growth. With fix, connections now consistently reject messages larger than 65KiB in size.
Update packages.
Extremely large RSA keys in certificate chains can cause a client/server to expend significant CPU time verifying signatures. With fix, the size of RSA keys transmitted during handshakes is restricted to <= 8192 bits. Based on a survey of publicly trusted RSA keys, there are currently only three certificates in circulation with keys larger than this, and all three appear to be test certificates that are not actively deployed. It is possible there are larger keys in use in private PKIs, but we target the web PKI, so causing breakage here in the interests of increasing the default safety of users of crypto/tls seems reasonable.
Processing an incomplete post-handshake message for a QUIC connection can cause a panic.
QUIC connections do not set an upper bound on the amount of data buffered when reading post-handshake messages, allowing a malicious QUIC connection to cause unbounded memory growth. With fix, connections now consistently reject messages larger than 65KiB in size.
N/A
SRPMS
- runc-1.1.9-2.el9_3.src.rpm
MD5: 6c193e468b1d128ed05b5d4d2a2283f3
SHA-256: c29612c04d93dc6e9546b6b0f84555d3b0b6bf9476364ffeac1a173ed1016dd2
Size: 2.36 MB
Asianux Server 9 for x86_64
- runc-1.1.9-2.el9_3.x86_64.rpm
MD5: e95bb91665ba352a6a8703c38c80276e
SHA-256: c117fec73d2664254a502f4f595f2ccf8c3867a332e91f5195dbf1ebc96edd69
Size: 3.07 MB