rsyslog-8.24.0-52.el7

The rsyslog packages provide an enhanced, multi-threaded syslog daemon. It supports MySQL, syslog/TCP, RFC 3195, permitted sender lists, filtering on any message part, and fine-grained control over output format.

Security Fix(es):

* rsyslog: heap-based overflow in contrib/pmaixforwardedfrom/pmaixforwardedfrom.c (CVE-2019-17041)

* rsyslog: heap-based overflow in contrib/pmcisconames/pmcisconames.c (CVE-2019-17042)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Additional Changes:

For detailed information on changes in this release, see the Asianux Server 7.8 Release Notes linked from the References section.

CVE-2019-17041
An issue was discovered in Rsyslog v8.1908.0. contrib/pmaixforwardedfrom/pmaixforwardedfrom.c has a heap overflow in the parser for AIX log messages. The parser tries to locate a log message delimiter (in this case, a space or a colon) but fails to account for strings that do not satisfy this constraint. If the string does not match, then the variable lenMsg will reach the value zero and will skip the sanity check that detects invalid log messages. The message will then be considered valid, and the parser will eat up the nonexistent colon delimiter. In doing so, it will decrement lenMsg, a signed integer, whose value was zero and now becomes minus one. The following step in the parser is to shift left the contents of the message. To do this, it will call memmove with the right pointers to the target and destination strings, but the lenMsg will now be interpreted as a huge value, causing a heap overflow.
CVE-2019-17042
An issue was discovered in Rsyslog v8.1908.0. contrib/pmcisconames/pmcisconames.c has a heap overflow in the parser for Cisco log messages. The parser tries to locate a log message delimiter (in this case, a space or a colon), but fails to account for strings that do not satisfy this constraint. If the string does not match, then the variable lenMsg will reach the value zero and will skip the sanity check that detects invalid log messages. The message will then be considered valid, and the parser will eat up the nonexistent colon delimiter. In doing so, it will decrement lenMsg, a signed integer, whose value was zero and now becomes minus one. The following step in the parser is to shift left the contents of the message. To do this, it will call memmove with the right pointers to the target and destination strings, but the lenMsg will now be interpreted as a huge value, causing a heap overflow.